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CONFRONTING CANNIBALISM
Lisa M. Kelly* & Shelby Percival**
Review of Hadley Louise Friedland, The Wetiko Legal
Principles: Cree and Anishinabek Responses to Violence
and Victimization (Univ. Toronto Press, 2018)
INTRODUCTION
In their first year of law school, common law students learn
of a figure who tests the boundaries of state punishment
and criminal culpability: the cannibal. The cannibals who
law students encounter are two sailors, Captain Tom
Dudley and his crewmate, Edwin Stephens, who set sail for
Australia from Southampton on May 19, 1884.1 Part of a
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1

Our account of the Mignonette’s voyage and the events that led to the
trials of Dudley and Stephens draws on the following secondary
sources: Allan C Hutchinson, Is Eating People Wrong?: Great Legal
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four-man crew, they were sailing the Mignonette to Sydney
for its new owner. Almost two months into their journey,
they were caught in a storm. An enormous wave damaged
the boat, and Dudley ordered his crew to abandon ship. The
crew hurriedly lowered the ship’s thirteen-foot lifeboat into
the water, managing to salvage only two cans of food and
no drinking water.
Within two weeks, having eaten all their provisions
and forced to drink their own urine, the men considered the
desperate maritime custom of sacrificing one shipman so
that the others could live. Richard Parker, the crew’s
seventeen-year-old cabin boy, had become gravely ill after
drinking seawater and was slipping in and out of
consciousness. Dudley suggested that they kill Parker to
save themselves. Dudley eventually slit Parker’s throat and
the three men consumed him. A few days later, a German
freighter rescued them.
From the moment of rescue, the seamen were
forthright about what they had done. Dudley and Stephens
believed that the laws of the sea justified killing in such

Cases and How They Shaped the World (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011); Michael G Mallin, “In Warm Blood: Some
Historical and Procedural Aspects of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens”
(1967) 34:2 U Chicago L Rev 387; AW Brian Simpson, Cannibalism
and the Common Law: The Story of the Tragic Last Voyage of the
Mignonette and the Strange Legal Proceedings to Which it Gave Rise
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Andrea Hibbard,
“Cannibalism and the Late-Victorian Adventure Novel: The Queen v.
Dudley and Stephens” (2019) 62:3 English Literature in Transition,
1880–1920 305.
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dire circumstances.2 At their bail hearing, defense counsel
urged the magistrates to reconsider the charge of murder.3
Citing Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England, the defense reminded the court of “the great
universal principle of self-preservation, which prompts
every man to save his own life preferable to that of
another.” 4 Amongst the seafaring community, popular
opinion was initially on their side. Fellow seamen
contributed generously to a legal defense fund, 5 and
Dudley expressed his “thanks for numerous favours of
sympathy to myself and companions” in a letter to the
Times of London.6
Dudley and Stephens did not fare as well before the
courts. At trial and on appeal, the presiding judges
convicted them of murder.7 Shoring up the law of murder
to apply in cases of maritime calamity, Lord Coleridge
refused to allow “compassion for the criminal to change or

2

See “The Wreck of the Mignonette”, The Times (9 September 1884) 3.

3

“The Wreck of the Mignonette”, The Times (12 September 1884) 4.

4

Ibid. See Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England, vol 4 (London: Strathan & Woodfall, 1795) at 185.

5

See Hibbard, supra note 1 at 308.

6

Hutchison, supra note 1 at 26.

7

For a discussion of whether the necessity defense is best conceptually
defined as an excuse or justification, see Edward M Morgan, “The
Defence of Necessity: Justification or Excuse?” (1984) 42:2 UT Fac L
Rev 165 (“[r]ather than compassion for the accused based on the
presence of an excusing condition, a justification seeks to establish that
the act for which he is charged did not constitute a criminal offence in
the first place” at 167).
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weaken in any manner the legal definition of the crime.”8
However, rather than donning the black hoods that judges
typically wore when condemning an accused to death, Lord
Coleridge paired his verdict with a request for royal
clemency. Six months after their conviction, Queen
Victoria pardoned Dudley and Stephens.9
For students of criminal law, the case bearing the
sailors’ names—R. v. Dudley and Stephens—stands for a
strict and narrow construction of the necessity defense.
Though the case captivates law students as a dystopian
thought experiment come to life, few, if any, learn of the
case’s political stakes at the time it was decided. This
historical amnesia cleanses the case of its imperialist roots.
For the Victorians, the ordeal of the Mignonette and the
resort to cannibalism by the sailors was about far more than
the scope or meaning of the necessity defense. At stake
were fundamental questions about what it meant to be
human, to be English, and to be civilized.
Professor Hadley Friedland’s illuminating and
important book, The Wetiko Legal Principles: Cree and
Anishinabek Responses to Violence and Victimization,
analyzes Indigenous legal responses to another cannibal
figure wholly absent from Canadian legal education to
date: the wetiko.10 As Friedland writes in the preface, “[t]he

8

R v Dudley and Stephens, [1884] EWHC 2 (QB), 14 QBD 273 [Dudley
and Stephens].

9

Simpson, supra note 1 at 239–41.

10

See Hadley Louise Friedland, The Wetiko Legal Principles: Cree and
Anishinabek Responses to Violence and Victimization (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2018).
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wetiko (or windigo) concept has existed within Cree and
Anishinabek societies for centuries.”11 While it has often
been translated into English as “cannibal,” it encompasses
far more than actual or metaphysical flesh-eating. At base,
it signals monstrosity. “Beyond the ancient stories of
cannibal giants who roamed the land,” Friedland writes,
“the concept is used to describe human beings who do
monstrous things.”12
Friedland opens and closes her text with two
stories—“Sweet Dirt” and “Beyond Sweet Dirt”—that tell
of haunting but ultimately hopeful encounters with wetikos.
These bookend stories, as Genevieve Painter has written,
“frame the book’s pleadings on why the wetiko stories
count as law,” and “cage the book’s common law
chapters,” thereby leaving us “free to imagine the worlds
left outside them.”13Storytelling as legal method provides
a transformative window into what law can be and who can
define it.14

11

Ibid at xvi.

12

Ibid.

13

Genevieve Painter, “Hadley Louise Friedland: The Wetiko Legal
Principles: Cree and Anishinabek Responses to Violence and
Victimization. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018. 144 pp.”,
Book Review (2019) 34:3 CJLS 557 at 559.

14

See Hadley Friedland & Val Napoleon, “Gathering the Threads:
Developing a Methodology for Researching and Rebuilding
Indigenous Legal Traditions” (2015) 1:1 Lakehead LJ 16; Rebecca
Johnson & Lori Groft, “Learning Indigenous Law: Reflections on
Working with Western Inuit Stories” (2017) 2:2 Lakehead LJ 117.
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The common thread that Friedland pulls through
these stories is the enduring question of how we should
protect the most vulnerable from abuse. Friedland’s work
goes further than simply acknowledging problems of
physical and sexual abuse. She explains the procedure
historically used by Cree and Anishinabek peoples when
dealing with wetiko figures, and in doing so, raises critical
questions for readers about the Canadian criminal law
system’s obsessive focus on punishment. The book is
informed by accounts of Cree Elders and knowledge
keepers, including wetiko stories that they learned as
children and that they will pass down to the next
generation.
In this essay, we consider the potentially
transformative role of wetiko stories for Canadian legal
education. Our aim is not to assimilate wetiko principles
into dominant legal training. Indeed, we share Friedland’s
resistance to studying wetiko stories primarily with a view
to reconciling them with Canadian state law.15 Rather, we
see in Cree and Anishinabek law important alternatives to
the punitive impulses that are characteristic of Canadian
criminal law. Where the English courts took pains to
condemn Dudley and Stephens as murderers who had
contravened Englishness itself, Cree and Anishinabek
peoples confronted monstrousness as a presence within.
Wetiko stories, Friedland reminds the reader again and
again, can provide tools for protecting “our children from

15

See Freidland, supra note 10 at 110 (“the most logical place to begin
further research is not wetiko law’s relationship with Canadian state
law at all,” Friedland writes. “Rather, the place to begin is within
Indigenous societies.”).
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terrible harms caused by people close to us, and [for]
thinking about how to recognize and respond to people
close to us who may cause terrible harm to others.” 16
Acknowledging this closeness provides a very different
vantage point to the distance that the common law urges
law students to construct between victims and offenders.
CANNIBALISM ON THE HIGH SEAS
Had the Mignonette sailed a century earlier, it is unlikely
history would remember the names of Dudley or Stephens,
and certainly not as men convicted of murder. British
maritime historians have shown how regulatory and
cultural changes transformed shipping over the long
nineteenth century.17 Labourers and progressive reformers
campaigned against the despotic and dangerous maritime
conditions that caused so many sailors to perish in
catastrophic and preventable shipwrecks. The eponymous
Plimsoll lines that mark safe submersion levels on ships—
a corrective against owners who frequently overloaded
ships and collected insurance payouts when the vessels
sank with crew on board—originated during this era, as did

16

Ibid at 74.

17

See Glen O’Hara, “‘The Sea is Swinging into View’: Modern British
Maritime History in a Globalised World” (2009) 124:510 Eng Hist Rev
1109.
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rules on minimum food, water, and accommodation
provisions for crew.18
The expansion of maritime regulation coincided
with and infused larger cultural transformations in English
seafaring. In popular literature and songs, Victorian
authors and lyricists recast ships as places of civility.
Breaking with the tradition of outcaste pirates and
avaricious captains, “Honest Jack” emerged as an exemplar
of altruistic and stoic masculinity. 19 In 1852, when the
H.M.S. Birkenhead was transporting troops to fight in the
Eighth Xhosa War, it sank off the coast of South Africa. As
it was sinking, the commanding officer allegedly ordered
the men to stand back to allow seven women and thirteen
children aboard to be rowed to safety.20 Immortalized in
Rudyard Kipling’s “Soldier an’ Sailor Too,” the chivalrous

18

See Nicolette Jones, The Plimsoll Sensation: The Great Campaign to
Save Lives at Sea (London: Little, Brown Book Group, 2006); Leon
Fink, Sweatshops at Sea: Merchant Seamen in the World's First
Globalized Industry, from 1812 to the Present (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2011).

19

See Jones, supra note 18 at 15.

20

See “The Wreck of the Birkenhead” in William OS Gilly, ed,
Narratives of Shipwrecks of the Royal Navy between 1793 and 1857,
3rd ed (London: 1864) 348; David Seton, Narrative of the Wreck of the
‘Birkenhead’ (London, 1890), cited in Lucy Delap, “‘Thus Does Man
Prove His Fitness to be the Master of Things’: Shipwrecks, Chivalry
and Masculinities in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Britain”
(2006) 3:1 Cult & Soc Hist 45 at 49.
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ethic of “women and children first” was invented as naval
tradition.21
This Victorian ethic of self-sacrifice challenged the
prevailing maritime custom of resorting to survivor
cannibalism in cases of shipwreck. The legal historian
A.W. Brian Simpson, in his work Cannibalism and the
Common Law, notes that English sailors regularly drew
lots in cases of starvation to decide both who would die and
who would do the killing. 22 Popular songs, newspapers,
and literary accounts recounted the macabre tradition. As
Simpson writes bluntly: “[t]here was nothing whatever
secret about the matter. What sailors did when they ran out
of food was to draw lots and eat someone.”23
By 1884, the year the Mignonette sank, legal and
cultural tides were turning. Not only was the state
exercising greater authority over conduct and conditions
aboard ships, social understandings of cannibalism were
also changing. Cannibalism—real and imagined—
increasingly became for the English a marker of
Indigenous barbarism in Africa, the Pacific, and the

21

See Rudyard Kipling, “Soldier an’ Sailor Too” (1893) in The Collected
Poems of Rudyard Kipling (London: Wordsworth, 2001) (“But to stand
an’ be still to the Birken’ead drill is a damn tough bullet to chew” at
447).

22

See supra note 1.

23

Ibid at 140.
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Americas.24 The famed explorer Richard Burton developed
a taxonomy of thirteen “African stares” after he journeyed
to the lakes region of East Africa from 1857–1859. Last
among them was the “stare cannibal”—the savage African
ready to consume another. 25 Colonial accounts of the
Pacific Islands likewise depicted Indigenous peoples as
cannibals. As Tracey Banivanua-Mar observes in her study
of nineteenth-century colonial discourses about Fiji:
[c]annibalism epitomized Fiji in Europe,
Australia, and the United States, where a
vibrant market emerged in postcards, travel
narratives,
missionary
reminiscences,
exhibits or traveling freak shows displaying
human [flesh] and other specimens.”26
By the time that Dudley and Stephens stood trial,
consuming human flesh evoked a barbarism that Victorians
sought to vanquish from within and project onto the
colonial other.

24

Surekha Davies, Book Review of An Intellectual History of
Cannibalism by Cătălin Avramescu, (2010) 20:2 Intell Hist Rev 275 at
276 (observing how post-colonial scholarship in recent years has
shown that “the cannibal has been perceived not only as evidence of
isolated madness or perversion, but also as a trope that pervades
colonial writing”).

25

See Dane Kennedy, The Highly Civilized Man: Richard Burton and the
Victorian World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005) at
115.

26

Tracey Banivanua-Mar, “Cannibalism and Colonialism: Charting
Colonies and Frontiers in Nineteenth-Century Fiji” (2010) 52:2 Comp
Stud Soc & Hist 255 at 257.
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Lord Coleridge appealed to this sense of civility in
upholding the conviction of Dudley and Stephens. Writing
for a unanimous court, he proffered a vision of English,
Christian seamen who would fulfill their duties to others
even to the point of death:
The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a captain
to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, of
soldiers to women and children, as in the
noble case of the Birkenhead; these duties
impose on men the moral necessity, not of the
preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives
for others, from which in no country, least of
all, it is to be hoped, in England, will men
ever shrink, as indeed, they have not
shrunk.27
Lord Coleridge breathed into criminal law a Victorian ideal
of duty-bound masculinity. Where maritime custom had
once acknowledged and regulated survival cannibalism,
eating another’s flesh was now cast as anathema to English
identity.
By reading this vision of chivalrous and honourable
English civility into law, Lord Coleridge, like his cultural
and literary counterparts, elided the realities of imperial
brutality and privation. The Birkenhead tradition of
“women and children first”—or, as Lucy Delap more
accurately describes it, “ladies . . ., [then] . . . white women
and children” first—was invented on a naval ship carrying
soldiers to fight a war of conquest against the Xhosa

27

Dudley and Stephens, supra note 8.
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people.28 In her study of late-Victorian adventure novels,
Andrea Hibbard observes that valiant heroes served to
inoculate readers from the “sordid spectacle of voracious
self-interest exhibited not only by the desperate Dudley and
Stephens, but on a much larger scale by the ‘scramble for
Africa’ and the New Imperialism.” 29 The rapacious
monstrousness at the heart of empire was concealed behind
a veneer of heroic civility.
THE MONSTROUS WITHIN
Reading wetiko stories alongside Dudley and Stephens
illuminates how imperial distinctions between the human
and the less-than-human, the civilized and the barbaric,
indelibly shaped legal systems in the colonies and the
metropole. At stake in Friedland’s work is the question of
how societies should conceive of and respond to
monstrosity. Not only did colonial projections of
monstrousness onto Indigenous peoples work to justify
brutal conquest in the name of a civilizing mission, they
also fueled the punitive response to Dudley and Stephens’
act of desperation. This impulse continues to shape
Canadian criminal law. While Friedland writes first and
foremost for Indigenous communities, every law student in
Canada would benefit from learning of the relational logic
at the heart of Cree and Anishinabek responses to violence
and victimization. Problems of violence, abuse, suffering,
and trauma cannot be denied away through projection or
punishment. Through Friedland’s recovery of wetiko
stories, we look monstrosity in the face. We see “darkness

28

Delap, supra note 20 at 52.

29

Supra note 1 at 318.
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in the daytime.” 30 But we also see clear-eyed collective
responses motivated by protection and repair. And, as such,
we “feel the brightness too.”31
Friedland is motivated by a deep concern with the
violence and victimization that grips too many Indigenous
communities today. Anguish and hope are palpable in her
writing. “Nowadays, many Indigenous people are
grieving,” she laments.32 “They are grieving the memories
of children and adults lost to violence and victimization,
both from residential schools and within communities. It’s
hard to think about what has happened to so many of our
children.” 33 Many Indigenous people “struggle to cope”
each day with “the horror, loss, and grief” that results from
“overwhelming” levels of violence.34 Mary Ellen TurpelLafond has long stressed the urgency of the situation:
[t]he pressing reality is that we have
unprecedented levels of violence experienced
in Aboriginal families and communities in
the current generation, likely connected to the

30

Friedland, supra note 10 at 10.

31

Ibid at 10.

32

Ibid at 11.

33

Ibid at 11–12.

34

Ibid at 12.
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intergenerational trauma from the residential
school experience.35
Colonial displacement and dispossession, the fracturing of
families and nations, and the ongoing repression of
Indigenous traditions have together left communities ripe
for cycles of abuse to set in over time.
To make matters worse, the pain of violence and
abuse is especially acute when inflicted by someone one
knows and trusts. This is the problem at the core of
Friedland’s book: how should Indigenous communities
respond to violence and abuse committed from within? The
challenge is a dual one of both protection and
rehabilitation. Rather than condemning those who harm
children as monstrous outsiders, Friedland acknowledges
the ties that bind victims and offenders, the vulnerable and
the broken. Her aim is to find within Indigenous legal
traditions, specifically wetiko stories, tools, and practices
to “think about and respond to . . . violence in principled
and effective ways.”36
Friedland draws parallels between the tactics,
characteristics, and possible causes of wetikoism and those
who abuse and sexually victimize children today. If the
analogy holds, she argues, then wetiko principles could be
“usefully applied to the present urgent issue of child

35

The Honourable ME Turpel-Lafond, “Some Thoughts on Inclusion and
Innovation in the Saskatchewan Justice System” (2005) 68:2 Sask L
Rev 293 at 295.

36

Friedland, supra note 10 at 112.
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victimization.”37 Friedland knowingly treads on dangerous
ground. The pedophile, the abusive parent, and the
woefully negligent caregiver attract a level of scorn in
dominant Canadian society today that marks them as the
cannibal of old—monstrous figures undeserving of human
community. As James Kincaid observes in his cultural
study of child molesting, “the recent translation of ‘sexual
offenders’ into ‘sexual predators’ transforms these
particular criminals into ogres, beyond redemption and
with no claim on human civil rights.” 38 The ogre, the
predator, and the starving sailor who kills and consumes
another mark themselves as less than fully human. Or do
they?
Rather than vilifying the wetiko as a foreign other,
Cree and Anishinabek peoples treated those who
committed monstrous acts as still one of their own. They
adopted a ladder approach to respond to violence and
victimization. Friedland shows through oral accounts,
written records, and interviews that healing was the first
and most common response to wetikoism. 39 A person
suspected of becoming a wetiko might be taken to a healer
or treated to generous hospitality in an effort to treat their
affliction. As with other responses, healing efforts were
only undertaken after community members considered all
the circumstances of a given case. Where healing failed or
proved insufficient to protect others from harm,
community members would closely supervise suspected
37

Ibid at 73.

38

James Kincaid, Erotic Innocence: The Culture of Child Molestation
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998) at 11.

39

See Friedland, supra note 10 at 85–86.
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wetikos, using coercive tactics as necessary.40 Community
members pursued other measures when necessary,
including supervision, separation, incapacitation, or, in
extreme cases, death.
Building on John Borrows’s work, Friedland
identifies three features of collective decision-making in
response to wetiko figures:
(1) legitimate decisions are collective and
open; (2) authoritative final decision-makers
are leaders, medicine people, and the closest
family members of the wetiko; and (3) there
are procedural steps to determine legitimate
and effective responses.41
These procedural steps include “recognizing and sharing
information about warning signs,” gathering evidence to
determine if a person “fits in the wetiko category,” and
deciding on a response. 42 In contrast to the reactive
Canadian criminal law, Cree and Anishinabek peoples
worked to prevent harm. “Intervention to prevent wetiko
transformations and behaviours is the most consistent
normative principle in these stories,” Friedland writes. 43
Justice measures were motivated not simply by after-thefact repudiation, but instead by a set of interlocking

40

See ibid at 88.

41

Ibid at 75.

42

Ibid at 79.

43

Ibid at 34–35.
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responsibilities among community members to prevent
suffering before it occurred.
LIVING HISTORY
In harnessing the past to serve the present, Friedland’s
work reveals the Faulknerian truth that the past is never
dead; it’s not even past. Law students learn early and often
that the Canadian Constitution and the common law are
living trees, not dead wood. And yet, when it comes to
Indigenous laws and traditions, they regularly learn the
opposite. They read judicial decisions by the country’s
highest court that in many cases require Indigenous
claimants to present backward-looking evidence of
practices preceding European contact. 44 To insist on the
vitality of Indigenous laws and traditions, as Friedland
does, is to insist on the vitality of Indigenous peoples. As
John Borrows has written, “[w]e are not past-tense peoples.
We should be physically free to travel through space and
philosophically at liberty to carry our ideas through
time.”45 Requiring Indigenous peoples to leave their legal
pasts behind, to treat them as regressive, or to access them

44

See e.g. R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507; R v Pamajewon [1996]
2 SCR 821.

45

John Borrows, “Physical Philosophy: Mobility and the Future of
Indigenous Rights” in Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent
McNeil, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative and
Critical Perspectives (Portland, OR: Hart, 2009) 403 at 419, cited in
Friedland, supra note 10 at 44.
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only in calcified form denies them the temporal liberty
accorded to Canada’s dominant legal system. 46
Excavating the past can also be fraught with pain.
This is especially true in the case of Indigenous stories and
traditions, which were so often weaponized by colonial
forces to instill a sense of shame. As Frantz Fanon
observed, internalized shame is the ultimate turn of the
colonial screw. “By a kind of perverted logic,” Fanon
wrote, the colonial power
turns to the past of the oppressed people, and
distorts, disfigures, and destroys it . . . the
total result looked for by colonial domination
was indeed to convince the natives that
colonialism came to lighten their darkness.47
Degrading Indigenous pasts advanced that most insidious
of colonial goals: the native should come to believe that he
was in need of European provenance.
One sees this logic at work in the colonial treatment
of wetiko stories. As Friedland notes, “Canadian

46

See e.g. CF Black, A Mosaic of Indigenous Legal Thought: Legendary
Tales and Other Writings (New York: Routledge, 2017); John
Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Lindsay Keegitah
Borrows, Otter’s Journey through Indigenous Language and Law
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018); Saliha Belmessous, Native Claims:
Indigenous Law Against Empire, 1500–1920 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011).

47

Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Constance
Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963) at 210–11.
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government and courts, as well as academics and
newspapers have used the wetiko stories to say Indigenous
people were superstitious, brutal, or uncivilized.”48 Settlers
used stories of monstrousness to cast Indigenous peoples
as barbaric. The fact that English maritime custom had long
recognized survivor cannibalism as legitimate was beside
the point. Many today feel “cautious, ashamed, or doubtful
about using the wetiko stories” based on a well-founded
fear that these stories will once again be turned against
Indigenous peoples.49
Friedland resists this understandable urge to not
drag stories of monstrousness into the light. For Friedland,
acknowledging violence and victimization, past and
present, is necessary to realize different ways of addressing
wrongdoing. “The wetiko stories are powerful examples of
Cree and Anishinabek peoples’ profound strength,
resourcefulness, and teamwork in protecting themselves
and those they love.”50 Rejuvenating wetiko stories offers
a set of tools to address violence and victimization beyond
the punitive logics of repudiation and retribution. More
importantly, Friedland’s project lays claim to the
Indigenous humanity that settlers once used these very
stories to deny: “where in the past the figure of the cannibal
has been used to construct differences and uphold racism,”
literary theorist Maggie Kilgour writes, “it now appears in

48

Friedland, supra note 10 at 13.

49

Ibid.

50

Ibid.

378

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020]

projects to deconstruct them.” 51 In laying bare the
“ordinariness of human monstrousness,” Friedland
identifies violence and suffering as unifying rather than
distinguishing features of humanity.52
BEYOND “RESTORATIVE JUSTICE”
Readers may be tempted to treat Friedland’s work as part
of the now voluminous literature on “restorative justice.”
For decades, progressive reformers around the world have
advocated for alternatives to the punitive and managerial
work of criminal law.53 In contrast to Western criminal law
systems, which are structured around state–offender dyads,
restorative justice practitioners advance “a process
whereby all parties with a stake in a particular offence
come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the

51

Maggie Kilgour “The Function of Cannibalism at the Present Time” in
Francis Barker, Peter Hulme & Margaret Iverson, eds, Cannibalism
and the Colonial World. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998) 238 at 242.

52
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future.”54 Key to these processes is the goal of preserving
and repairing human relationships. “Restorative justice
must be sought through practices which integrate the
wrongdoer so they remain in the relationship,” write
Jennifer Llewellyn and Robert Howse, “and not through
punishment which isolates the wrongdoer and removes
them from relationship.” 55 Restorative justice programs
can provide victims an opportunity to have their voices
heard in a forum that is attuned to their needs and
preferences.56 Advocates emphasize that restorative justice
does not mean that a wrongdoer escapes punishment or
responsibility. In fact, restorative justice programs often
require offenders to take responsibility for wrongdoing
before entering into discussion with individuals or
communities affected by that wrong.57
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However, “restorative justice” is not a term that
appears in Friedland’s text. The omission is undoubtedly
purposeful. As it has proliferated across legal contexts,
restorative justice has gradually gained specific
connotations, some of which cut against the outcome that
Friedland seeks. Elsewhere, Friedland has written critically
with Val Napoleon on the limits of “restorative justice” as
it is popularly used in Canada.58 In particular, they have
criticized those who too frequently reduce “restorative
justice” to healing and then conflate this narrowed concept
with “Aboriginal justice” generally.59
Friedland’s text may be better understood as a
critical intervention in restorative justice work. The fact
that she focuses on violence and victimization, including
sexual abuse, is especially significant. The use of
restorative justice in the context of sexual violence and
abuse remains deeply controversial. Skeptics have
expressed concern that restorative justice programs may revictimize vulnerable complainants, trivialize gender-based
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violence, and further endanger victims.60 What Friedland’s
work demonstrates is that local laws and practices can offer
modes of protection and repair that the state system has
failed to provide. Cree and Anishinabek responses to
wetikoism offer examples of how communities might
observe and collect information to assist offenders and
those around them, deal with violent behavior, and provide
a process for escalating proceedings if help and healing are
not accepted. 61 As John Borrows has written, “[i]n
Anishinabek law, legal remedies are not usually punitive.
However, examples can be found in which drastic action
had to be taken against individuals to preserve community
safety.” 62 It is simply not the case that Indigenous legal
traditions lack the tools to deal with forms of monstrous
violence and victimization that afflict every human society.
All that said, even as the text elucidates wetiko
principles and discusses at length the elements that may
contribute to abuse, Friedland leaves readers without a
clear sense of how these approaches might operate in
practice today. What would a new future that attempted to
deal holistically with underlying causes of wetikoism look
like? What institutional forms and processes might allow
for more productive responses to child abuse in Indigenous
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communities today? Would these initiatives exist in
relationship with, or wholly separate from, existing
programs? As more Indigenous nations push for greater
sovereignty over both child welfare and criminal
proceedings, these questions will only become more
pressing. Readers will hope for future work from Friedland
that will attempt to operationalize her insights.
CONCLUSION
Societies define themselves in part by how they understand
and respond to monstrousness. Recapitulating defenses of
the individual psyche, societies often project monstrosity
onto others as a way of rendering themselves pure. In her
meditation on cannibalism, anthropologist Shirley
Lindenbaum identifies projection as a common thread.
“The common factor in the history of cannibal allegations,”
Lindenbaum writes, “is the combination of denial in
ourselves and attribution of it to those who we wish to
defame, conquer, and civilize.” 63 This is the imperialist
posture at the heart of Dudley and Stephens—a posture that
has been erased over time in legal training that abstracts the
case from its historical and material context. When Lord
Coleridge deemed survivor cannibalism an offence against
Englishness, he implicitly conjured the savage cannibal in
need of English saving.
Unmasking the history of English survivor
cannibalism and the colonial imperative to criminalize it
reveals only half the picture. Hadley Friedland’s work is
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daring because she refuses to deny or look away from
monstrousness. In doing so, she steps outside of the
colonial mindset altogether. She is not interested in denial
as a defence against the colonizer’s dehumanizing
projections. Instead, what drives Freidland’s text is a
humane and pragmatic invitation to Cree and Anishinabek
peoples to draw on their own traditions to address violence
and victimization today.
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